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ABSTRACT: In this article, we introduce a method to make visible the dif-
ferences among people regarding how they conceptualize the world. The
Grounded Intersubjective Concept Analysis (GICA) method first employs a
conceptual survey designed to elicit particular ways in which concepts are
used among participants, aiming to exclude the level of opinions and values.
The subsequent analysis and visualization reveals potential underlying group-
ings of people, concepts and contexts. An awareness and reflection process
is then initiated based on these results. This method, combining qualitative
and quantitative components, leads into the externalization and sharing of
tacit knowledge. Thereby the GICAmethod builds up a common ground for
mutual understanding, and is particularly well suited for strengthening par-
ticipatory processes. Participatory methods have been designed for including
stakeholders in decision making processes. They do this by eliciting differ-
ent opinions and values of the stakeholders. The underlying assumption,
however, is that there are no significant conceptual differences among the
participants. Nevertheless, often the failures of the participatory process can
be traced back to such hidden conceptual differences. As an unfortunate out-
come, crucial experiential knowledge may go unrecognized or differences in
the meanings of words used may be misconstrued as differences in opinions.
The GICA method aims at alleviating these problems.
KEYWORDS: Subjectivity, intersubjectivity, communication, miscommuni-
cation, participatory methods, data analysis, statistical machine learning
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1 INTRODUCTION
Often we take for granted that we are able to understand each other. It is the
occasional clear failure that allows us to see that understanding language is
often difficult.
In making the connection between a word and its typical and appropri-
ate use, we rely on a long learning process. The process is made possible
and guided by our genetic make-up, but its success requires also extensive
immersion to a culture and contexts of using words and expressions. To the
extent that these contexts are shared among individual language speakers we
are then able to understand each other. When our learning contexts dif-
fer, however, differences in understanding the concepts themselves arise and
subsequent communication failures begin to take place.
It is obvious that if the context of learning has been completely different,
i.e., if two persons have learned different languages, the basis for mutual un-
derstanding through exchanging linguistic expressions is very limited or even
non-existent. Self-evidently, without an access to gestures or an external con-
text it is not possible to know what “Ble mae’r swyddfa bost agosaf?” or “Non
hurbilen dagoen postetxean da?” means unless one has learned Welsh or
Basque language. This example can naturally be extended to less trivial cases
as well. Considering the readers of this article it is fair to assume that every
one of them speaks English. Nevertheless, it is difficult for most to under-
stand expressions like “a metaphyseal loading implant employes a modified
mechanoregulatory algorithm” or “bosonic fields commute and fermionic
fields anticommute” unless one is an expert in a particular area of medicine
or physics. Even expressions in everyday informal language such as “imma
imba, lol” can seem obscure if one is not familiar with the youth language
in the internet. In addition to these kinds of clear cut cases there are more
subtle situations in which two or several persons think that they understand
each other even though they actually do not. It seems realistic to think that
a person assumes that others understand her when she says “this is not fair”,
“do you like me?”, “I saw a small house”, or “that country is democratic”.
However, it is far from guaranteed that the others would actually interpret
words “fair”, “like”, “small” or “democratic” in the same way as the speaker.
In this paper, building on previous work (Honkela & Vepsäläinen 1991;
Honkela, Könönen, Lindh-Knuutila & Paukkeri, 2008; Janasik, Honkela
& Bruun, 2009), we present a methodological innovation that aims to im-
prove a) mutual understanding in communication, and b) the inclusion of
stakeholder concerns in complex decision making contexts. The proposed
method builds on 1) an understanding of the grounded nature of all con-
cepts, and the dynamic and subjective nature of concept formation and use;
and 2) the recognition that the best way to elicit and represent such concepts
is one that combines elements from qualitative case research and quantitative
learning methods. We call this method Grounded Intersubjective Concept
Analysis (GICA). The word ’grounded’ refers to both the qualitative method
of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and to the idea of the em-
bodied grounding of concepts in human experience (Harnad 1990). The
method includes three main steps: (A) Preparation, (B) Focus session(s), and
(C) Knowledge to action activities. These steps can be repeated iteratively.
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The focus sessions are supported with computational tools that enable the
analysis and visualization of similarities and differences in the underlying
conceptual systems.
We begin by showing examples of contextuality and subjectivity in inter-
pretation and continue by considering a modern internet-based activity, i.e.
crowdsourcing that highlights subjective differences in knowledge-intensive
activities.
1.1 Contextuality and subjectivity
It is commonplace in linguistics to define semantics as dealing with proto-
typical meanings whereas pragmatics would be associated with meanings in
context. For our purposes, this distinction is not relevant since interpretation
of natural language expressions always takes place in some context, usually
even within multiple levels of context including both linguistic and extra-
linguistic ones. In the contrary case, that is, when an ambiguous word such
as “break” appears alone without any specific context one can only try to
guess which of its multiple meanings could be in question. If there is even a
short contextual cue — “break the law”, or “have a break”, or “how to break
in billiards” – it is usually possible to arrive at a more accurate interpretation.
Also the extralinguistic context of an expression usually helps in disambigua-
tion.
In some cases, the interpretation of expression can be numerically quan-
tified and thus more easily compared. For instance, the expression “a tall
person” can be interpreted as a kind of measure of the height of the person.
The interpretation of ’tallness’ can be experimentally studied in two ways. Ei-
ther one can be asked to tell the prototypical height of a person that is tall, or
one can tell whether different persons of some height are tall or not (maybe
associated with some quantifiers such as “quite” or “very”). Sometimes this
kind of quantification is conducted using the framework of fuzzy set theory
(Zadeh 1965). However, consideration of the tallness of a person is only a
tip of an iceberg of the complexity of interpretation. A small giraffe or build-
ing is usually higher than a tall person. A person who is 5 feet or 1 meter
52 centimeters is not prototypically considered tall – unless a young child is
in question. Also many other contextual factors influence the interpretation
such as gender, historical time (people used to be shorter hundreds of years
ago), and even profession (e.g. basketball players versus fighter pilots).
The tallness example also provides a view on subjectivity. If we ask from
a thousand people the question “How tall is a tall person?”, we receive many
different answers, and if we ask “If a person is x cm tall, would you call
him/her a tall person?”, the answer varies among respondents. The distri-
bution of answers to such questions reflects the individual variation in the
interpretation of ‘tall’. If the pattern in question is more complex and a num-
ber of context features are taken into account, the issue of subjective models
becomes even more apparent, unless it is assumed that such information for
interpretation (linking language with perceptions) would be genetically de-
termined. There are some researchers such as Jerry Fodor who suggest that
linguistic skills are innate and strongly modular (see, e.g. Fodor 1998). Fodor
even claims conceptual contents to be innate and is thus a proponent of ex-
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treme concept nativism. However, it seems that the arguments supporting
the centrality of learning are more realistic (c.f. e.g. Gärdenfors 2000, Prince
& Smolensky 1997, Pulvermüller 2001, Ritter & Kohonen 1989, Smolensky
2006, Tomasello 2000).
Another simple example on subjectivity is found in naming colors. Dif-
ferences and similarities in color naming and color concepts in different lan-
guages have been studied carefully (see e.g. Kay & McDaniel 1978, Cook,
Kay & Regier 2005). In addition, unless prototypical colors such as pure
black, white, red, green, etc. are chosen, individual people tend to name
a sample color in different ways. What is dark blue for someone, may be
black to someone else, etc. A similar straightforward illustration of subjectiv-
ity of interpretation is the naming of patterns. For instance, people name the
shapes shown in Fig. 1 in different ways except for the clear cases in the ends
of the continuum (Honkela and Pöllä 2009). It is important to note that the
Figure 1: A continuum of shapes.
kind of subjectivity discussed above is usually not dealt with in computational
or formal theories of language and understanding. On the other hand, this
phenomenon is self-evident for practitioners in many areas of activity as well
as in relation to practice oriented fields in the humanities. However, subjec-
tivity has been difficult to quantify. In this paper, we introduce a method that
is meant to make the subjectivity of interpretation and understanding explicit
and visible even in non-trivial cases.
1.2 Shedding light on subjectivity: crowdsourcing
In the Web 2.0 world, crowdsourcing is a specific activity that relies on the
input from masses of people (see e.g. Brabham 2008). In crowdsourcing,
tasks traditionally performed by an employee or contractor are outsourced to
a group people or community in the form of an open call. Social bookmark-
ing is a specific example of crowdsourcing in which the expert task of meta
data provision as library categories or keywords is replaced by an activity by
masses of users. They label items such as articles or books to characterize
their contents. In contrast with the expert activity, in social bookmarking no
formalized category system or keyword list is in use. This means, in practice,
that the individual variation in labeling becomes clearly visible. For example,
in the social bookmarking web site delicious.com the Wikipedia page on the
Self-Organizing Map (SOM) method has been given one to twelve labels by
128 different users (as of 20th of October, 2009). The labels for SOM given
by at least 10 users are: AI, neural networks, visualization, som, wikipedia,
clustering, programming, neural, kohonen, research, network, algorithms,
and statistics. Additionally, a large number of labels was suggested by one or
two users only. Examples of such rare labels include neurotic, mind map,
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and research result. This illustrates the idea that there is a shared prototyp-
ical core with large amount of variation surrounding it. It seems, however,
that the most common labels coincide with the ones that an expert would
give. This is partly explained by the fact that many of the users are either
experts, students as emerging experts, or professional amateurs. Moreover,
the subjectivity in labeling is not limited to social bookmarking. Furnas et
al. (1987) have found that in spontaneous word choice for objects in five do-
mains, two people favored the same term with a probability that was less than
0.2. Similarly for indexing documents with words, where Bates (1986) has
shown that different indexers, who are well trained in the indexing scheme,
might assign index terms for a given document differently. It has also been
observed that an indexer might use different terms for the same document
at different times. These kinds of differences can partly be explained by ran-
domness in the word choice but an essential component also seems to be the
differences in how people conceptualize various phenomena. In the follow-
ing, we introduce with increasing detail how these differences can be made
visible.
1.3 Becoming conscious of individual differences as a way of increasing understand-
ing
For the most part, people do not seem to be aware of the subjectivity of their
perceptions, concepts, or world views. Furthermore, one might claim that
we are more typically conscious of differences in opinions, whereas differ-
ences in perception or in conceptual level are less well understood. It is even
possible that to be able to function efficiently it is best to mostly assume that
my tools of communication are shared by people around me. However, there
are situations where this assumption breaks to a degree that merits further at-
tention. An example is the case when speakers of the same language from
several disciplines, interest groups, or several otherwise closely knit cultural
contexts come together to deliberate on some shared issues.
The background assumption of the GICAmethod innovation is the recog-
nition that although different people may use the same word for some phe-
nomenon, this does not necessarily mean that the conceptualization under-
lying this word usage is the same; in fact, the sameness at the level of names
may hide significant differences at the level of concepts. Furthermore, there
may be differences at many levels: experiences, values, understanding of the
causal relationships, opinions and regarding the meanings of words. The dif-
ferences in meanings of words are the most deceptive, because to discuss any
of the other differences, a shared vocabulary which is understood in roughly
the same way, is necessary. Often a difference in the meanings of used words
remains unrecognized for a long time; it may, for instance, be misconstrued
as a difference in opinions. Alternatively, a difference in opinions, or regard-
ing a decision that the group makes, may be masked and remain unrecog-
nized, because the same words are used seemingly in accord, but in fact in
different meanings by different people. When these differences are not rec-
ognized during communication, it often leads to discord and unhappiness
about the end result. As a result, the joint process may be considered to have
failed in one or even all of its objectives.
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Mustajoki (2008) present a model of miscommunication for which the
underlying insights and motivation resembles to a large extend this article as
well as the model presented in (Honkela et al. 2008). He concludes that
in the scientific literature on failures in communication different terms are
occasionally used to describe similar matters and researchers also tend to use
the same terms with different meanings. In this article, we do not aim to
review the research on miscommunication but refer to (Mustajoki 2008) as
a good overview. In the following, we present as our contribution a division
into two main types of problems.
1.4 False agreements and false disagreements
Undiscovered meaning differences can cause two types of problems. The
first type is false agreement, where on the surface it looks as if we agree, but
in fact our conceptual difference hides the underlying difference in opinions
or world views. For example, we might all agree that “the Aalto University
should be innovative” or that “Aalto University should aim at excellence in
research and education” but could totally disagree about what “innovative”
or “excellence” means. As another example, we might agree that “we need
a taxing system that is fair and encourages people to work” but might be in
considerable disagreement regarding the practical interpretation of “fair” and
“encourages”.
The second type of problem caused by undiscovered meaning differences
is false disagreement. If we are raised (linguistically speaking) in different
sub-cultures, wemight come to share ideas and views, but might have learned
to use different expressions to describe them. This may lead to considerable
amount of unnecessary argument and tension, in short, surface disagreement,
that hides the underlying agreement.
Since a lot of human endeavour when meeting with others seems to deal
with uncovering conceptual differences in one way or another, it would be
beneficial to have tools which can aid us in the discovery process—tools
which might make visible the deeper conceptual level behind our surface
level of words and expressions.
1.5 Making differences in understanding visible
Our aimwith the Grounded Intersubjective Concept Analysis (GICA)method
is to devise a way in which differences in conceptualization such as described
above can be made visible and integrated into complex communication and
decision making processes. An attempt to describe the meaning of one word
by relying on other words often fails, because the descriptive words them-
selves are understood differently across the domains. In fact, a domain may
have a large number of words that have their specialized meanings. The
more specific aims of this paper are to define the problem domain, to explain
the processes of concept formation from a cognitive point of view based on
our modeling standpoint, and to propose a methodology that can be used
for making differences in conceptual models visible in a way that forms a
basis for mutual understanding when different heterogeneous groups inter-
act. Contexts of application are, for instance, public planning processes,
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environmental problem solving, interdisciplinary research projects, product
development processes, and mergers of organizations.
Our view is that the GICAmethod, by allowing the elicitation, representa-
tion and integration of concepts grounded in the experience of stakeholders,
takes participatory methods one step further. Last but not least, by allowing
the integration of conceptual and experiential worlds of lay stakeholders usu-
ally deemed marginal from the point of view of existing modes of producing
expertise (such as, e.g., science and engineers), it can be seen as a providing
a tool for reducing marginalization.
In the following, we will discuss the theoretical background of the GICA
method, and present the method in detail. If the reader is mainly interested
in the practical value and application of the method, the following section
may be skipped.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The section on the cognitive theory of concepts focuses on how subjectivity
in understanding can be explicitly modeled in a way that provides a basis for
the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 3.
2.1 Cognitive theory of concepts and understanding
The amount of philosophical and scientific literature on concepts is huge
and it is not possible to review here any significant proportion of it.
According to one common view, often held by logic-oriented researchers,
concepts are seen independent of any historical, contextual or subjective fac-
tors. The works in the tradition of analytical philosophy typically represent
this kind of view. One attempt to create a connection between linguistic
expressions and formal concepts was Richard Montague’s work (Montague
1973). His central thesis was that there is no essential difference between
the semantics of natural languages (like English) and formal languages (like
predicate logic), i.e., there is a rigorous way how to translate English sen-
tences into an artificial logical language (Montague 1973). Montague gram-
mar is an attempt to link directly the syntactic and semantic level of language.
In order to do so, Montague defined the syntax of declarative sentences as
tree structures and created an interpretation of those structures using an in-
tensional logic. The end result was a focus on such aspects of language that
nicely fit with the theoretical framework. Examples of language considered
includes sentences like “Bill walks”, “every man walks”, “the man walks”,
and “John finds an unicorn” (Montague 1973). It may be fair to say that most
of the linguistic phenomena are set aside. Montague even assumes that the
original sentences can be considered unambiguous even though ambiguity
is a central phenomenon in language at many levels of abstraction. The idea
of being rigorous may be considered a proper stand but it often leads to the
negligence of the original complexity of the phenomenon being considered
(Von Foerster 2003).
Many philosophers outside the analytical tradition have already for some
time criticized the approach of logical formalization within philosophy of
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language. For instance, representatives of phenomenology (e.g. Edmund
Husserl and Martin Heidegger), hermeneutics (e.g. Martin Heidegger and
Hans-Georg Gadamer) and critical theory (e.g. Max Horkheimer and Jür-
gen Habermas) have presented alternative views. Richard Rorty (1979) at-
tacks the correspondence theory of truth (that truth is established by directly
comparing what a sentence asserts regarding the "facts” applying), and even
denies that there are any ultimate foundations for knowledge at all. He calls
for a socially-based theory of understanding. He also strongly criticizes the
notion of truth: Truth is not a common property of true statements, and the
good is what proves itself to be so in practice. Rorty combines pragmatism
(cf. e.g. John Dewey and Charles S. Peirce) with the philosophy of language
by later Wittgenstein which declares that meaning is a social-linguistic prod-
uct. It is far from obvious that communication between speakers of one and
the same language would be based on commonly shared meanings as often
suggested by the proponents of formal semantics, either explicitly or implic-
itly. This leads to the rejection of the idea of an idealized language user and
to the rejection of the possibility of considering central epistemological ques-
tions and natural language semantics without consideration of subjectivity
and variability. In other words, the language of a person is idiosyncratic and
based on the subjective experiences of the individual (Honkela, 2007). Carey
(2009) considers carefully the relationship between cognition and concepts
and provides a useful developmental view.
At the socio-cultural level, humans create and share conceptual artifacts
such as symbols, words and texts. These are used as mediators between dif-
ferent minds. In communicating and sharing knowledge, individuals have to
make a transformation between their internal representation into an explicit
representation to be communicated – and vice versa. The internalization and
externalization processes take place as a continuous activity. In externaliza-
tion, the internal view is externalized as explicit and shared representations.
In the internalization process, an individual takes an expression and makes
it her own, perhaps using it in a way unique to herself (cf. e.g. Santrock
2004). The internalization of linguistic signs typically takes place as an itera-
tive process. An individual is exposed to the use of an expression in multiple
contexts. This distribution of contexts provides a view on the meaning of
the expression as it is commonly understood by the others. However, due to
differences in the individual life and learning paths, different subjects have
gained different conceptual constructions. Therefore, the language use in-
cludes subcultures as well as individual idiosyncrasies. The idea of different
points of view is illustrated in Fig. 2.
One classical, but in this context less useful, approach for defining con-
cepts is based on the idea that a concept can be characterized by a set of
defining attributes. As an alternative, the prototype theory of concepts pro-
poses that concepts have a prototype structure and there is no delimiting set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for determining category membership—
instead, the membership can be graded. In prototype theory, instances of a
concept can be ranked in terms of their typicality. Membership in a category
is determined by the similarity of an object’s attributes to the category pro-
totype. The development of prototype theory is based on the works by, e.g.,
Rosch (1973) and Lakoff (1987).
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Figure 2: Illustration of the effect of the point of view. The cone can be seen
as a triangle or as a circle depending on the dimensions of reality that are
observed or factors that are valued.
Gärdenfors (2000) distinguishes between three cognitive levels of repre-
sentation. The most abstract level is the symbolic level, at which the infor-
mation is represented in terms of symbols that can be manipulated without
taking into account their meaning. The least abstract level is the subconcep-
tual representation. Concepts are explicitly modeled at the mediating level
of the conceptual representation.
A conceptual space is built upon geometrical structures based on a num-
ber of quality dimensions (Gärdenfors 2000). Concepts are not independent
of each other but can be structured into domains, e.g., concepts for colors in
one domain, spatial concepts in another domain. Fig. 3 shows an example
of a conceptual space consisting of two quality dimensions, and two different
ways (A and B) of dividing the space into concepts.
In general, the theory of conceptual spaces proposes a medium to get
from the continuous space of sensory information to a higher conceptual
level, where concepts could be associated with discrete symbols. This map-
ping is a dynamic process. Gärdenfors (2000) has proposed that for example
multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) and self-organizing maps (SOM) (Koho-
nen, 2001) can be used in modeling this mapping process. The simplest
connection between the SOM and conceptual spaces is to consider each
prototype or model vector m in a SOM as an emerged conceptual category
c. Related research on conceptual modeling using the SOM includes (Rit-
ter & Kohonen 1989, Honkela, Pulkki & Kohonen 1995, Lagus, Airola &
Creutz, 2002, Raitio et al., 2004).
2.2 Subjective conceptual spaces
Two persons may have very different conceptual densities with respect to a
particular topic. For instance, in Fig. 3 person A has a rather evenly dis-
tributed conceptual division of the space, whereas person B has a more fine-
grained conceptual division on the left side of the conceptual space, but has
lower precision on the right side of the space.
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Figure 3: Illustration of differing conceptual densities of two agents having a
2-dimensional quality domain. Points mark the locations of the prototypes of
concepts. Lines divide the concepts according to Voronoi tessellation. Both
agents can discriminate an equal number of concepts, but abilities of the
agent B are more focused on the left half of the quality dimension 1, whereas
agent A represents the whole space with rather equal precision.
When language games were included in the simulation model, it resulted
in a simple language emerging in a population of communicating autonomous
agents (Lindh-Knuutila, Lagus & Honkela 2006). In the population, each
agent first learned a conceptual model of the world, in solitary interaction
with perceptual data from the world. As a result, each agent obtained a
somewhat different conceptual representation (a schematic illustration of the
kinds of differences that can arise is shown in Fig. 3). Later, common names
for the previously learned concepts were learned in communication with an-
other agent.
2.3 Intersubjectivity in conceptual spaces
If some agents speak the “same language”, many of the symbols and the asso-
ciated concepts in their vocabularies are the same. A subjective conceptual
space emerges through an individual self-organization process. The input for
the agents consists of perceptions of the environment, and expressions com-
municated by other agents. The subjectivity of the conceptual space of an
individual is a matter of degree. The conceptual spaces of two individual
agents may be more or less different. The convergence of conceptual spaces
stems from two sources: similarities between the individual experiences (as
direct perceptions of the environment) and communication situations (mu-
tual communication or exposure to the same linguistic/cultural influences
such as upbringing and education, and artifacts such as newspapers, books,
etc.). In a similar manner, the divergence among conceptual spaces of agents
is caused by differences in the personal experiences/perceptions and differ-
ences in the exposure to linguistic/cultural influences and artifacts.
The basic approach regarding how autonomous agents could learn to
communicate and form an internal model of the environment applying the
self-organizing map algorithm was introduced, in a simple form, in (Honkela
1993). The model has been later substantially refined in (Lindh-Knuutila,
Honkela & Lagus 2006, Honkela et al. 2008).
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2.4 Conceptual differences in collaborative problem solving
Collaborative problem solving among experts can in principle be achieved in
two ways: (1) by bringing forth a combination of the opinions of the experts
by e.g. voting, or (2) by a more involved sharing or integration of expertise
and experience at the conceptual level. A particular form of sharing expertise
is sharing prototypes. This refers to a process in which an expert communi-
cates prototypical cases to the other expert. So-called boundary objects (Star
& Griesemer 1989), i.e. objects or facts that are well-known across various
backgrounds and scientific disciplines, are often used as suitable prototypical
cases. In the methodological context of the self-organizing map and other
prototype-based conceptual models, this means transmitting a collection of
model vectorsmi.
Let us consider the features (essentially quality dimensions; Gärdenfors
2000) that span the conceptual space, data set (“experience”) used by an
individual expert in learning the structure of its conceptual space, and the
naming of concepts. These three elements give rise to a typology of concep-
tual differences among experts. In the following, we present these different
categories as well as the basic approaches for dealing with problems related
to each category.
a) In the simplest case, the quality dimension space and data set are
(nearly) equivalent for both agents. Only concept naming differs among dif-
ferent agents. An agent has an individual mapping function that maps each
symbol to the conceptual space of the agent. In a classical simulation of this
kind, a number of robots with cameras learned to name visual objects in a
similar manner (see Steels 1998). An active research in language games and
language evolution has since emerged (see e.g. Vogt 2005, Lindh-Knuutila,
Honkela & Lagus 2006, Honkela et al. 2008). Chen (1994) has presented
a specific solution to the vocabulary problem among humans based on clus-
tering. Irwin’s (1995) view that contextual knowledge may ultimately be con-
structed in scientific terms might be rooted in the view that differences in
perspective are mainly a matter of concept naming. This view might also
figure in the background of much traditional or “standard” thinking in the
domains of medicine and innovation.
b) As a step towards increased differences among the agents, one may con-
sider the situation in which the feature space is equivalent, but data set per
expert varies. One expert has denser data from one part of the concept space,
the other for another part (see Fig. 3). An obvious approach for efficient
decision making is to use the expertise of those agents whose conceptual
mapping is densest with regard to the problem at hand. However, in many
cases, problem solving requires combination of many elements e.g. as solu-
tions of subproblems. In those cases, each element can be dealt with by the
expert with the densest conceptual mapping regarding a particular subprob-
lem. Collins and Evans’ (2002) advocation of the extension of “technical”
expertise to include also “uncertified”, experience-based expertise might be
rooted in the view that there exists a multitude of dense data sets, some of
which are officially credentialized while others are not. This view might also
be behind calls for taking the views and experiences of patients more seri-
ously, as well as behind recent calls to integrate the perspective of the user in
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the innovation process at an earlier stage than is often the case (e.g. Hyysalo
2006).
c) Finally, consider the most challenging case where neither the quality
dimension space nor the data set are the same for both agents. Fig. 2 depicts
a simple case in which the quality dimension spaces are different, therefore
offering different viewpoints of the same “data sample” to the agents. In
this case, a process of data augmenting can take place: if a subset of data
samples known to both can be found (for example, boundary objects known
across disciplines, or in terms of medicine, a particular patient’s case), each
agent can bring forth their particular knowledge (i.e. values of quality di-
mensions known only to them) regarding that case. Furthermore, in addition
to collaborating in solving the present problem, both agents also have the
opportunity to learn from each other: to augment their own representation
with the new data offered by the other expert. Obtaining augmented infor-
mation regarding several data samples will lead to the emergence of new,
albeit rudimentary quality dimensions, and allow easier communication in
future encounters. As an example, mutual data augmentation can take place
between doctors of different specialization, doctors and patients, or between
doctors and nurses, who consider simultaneously the same patient case. In
optimal circumstances, this may eventually lead to better expertise of both.
However, this requires that the doctor also trusts the patient, and is willing
to learn and store the experiential data communicated by the patient. Es-
sentially the same preconditions for and constraints to the process of data
augmenting apply in the contexts of environmental policy and innovation.
3 THE GICA METHOD
In the following, we present a method called Grounded Intersubjective Con-
cept Analysis (GICA) for improving the visibility of different underlying con-
ceptual systems among stakeholder groups.
The method includes three main stages:
A Preparation,
B Focus session(s), and
C Knowledge to action activities.
These steps can be repeated iteratively. The focus sessions are supported
with computational tools that enable the analysis and visualization of simi-
larities and differences in the underlying conceptual systems. In this presen-
tation, we use the Self-Organizing Map algorithm (Kohonen 1982, 2001)—
however, also other methods for dimensionality reduction and visualization
could be used including multidimensional scaling (MDS) (Kruskal & Wish
1978, see also Venna&Kaski 2006), Curvilinear Component Analysis (CCA)
(Demartines & Hérault 1997), Isomap (Tenenbaum, de Silva & Langford
2000), or Neighbor Retrieval Visualizer (NeRV) (Venna et al. 2010). Hierar-
chical clustering or decision tree learning methods are not recommended for
the current purpose because they may create artifactual categorical distinc-
tions which actually do not exist. In fact, one of the underlying motivations
3 THE GICA METHOD 17
for the proposed method is to help people to realize that real world phenom-
ena have a lot of underlying complexity which is not visible if conceptual
categorizations are applied too straightforwardly.
Figure 4: Aalto University students participating EIT ICT Labs activity
“Wellbeing Innovation Camp”.
In this report, the GICA method is illustrated with a case study related
to wellbeing concepts. The topic was handled in the EIT ICT Labs activ-
ity “Wellbeing Innovation Camp” that took place from 26th to 29th of Oc-
tober 2010 in Vierumäki, Finland. The seminar participants, mainly from
Aalto University School of Science and Technology, Macadamia Master’s
Programme in Machine Learning and Data Mining and from Aalto Univer-
sity School of Art and Design, Department of Design (see Fig. 4.
3.1 Introduction to subjectivity and context analysis
A word does not carry any information in its form about its meaning. The
surface form of the word “cat’ is close to the word “mat”, but its meaning can
be deemed to be closer to “dog” than to “mat”. It is possible, though, to study
the relationships of words based on the context in which they appear. Let us
consider an illustrative example shown in Fig. 5. On the left most column
are the words under consideration. There are eight columns each indicating
a document. The cells in the table contain frequencies of how often a word
appears in a document. In this simple example, it is clear already through
visual inspection that the words “house”, “building”, “bridge” and “tower”
appear frequently in document numbered from 1 to 4, whereas the words
“cat”, “dog”, “horse” and “cow” can be found often in documents numbered
from 5 to 8.
The self-organizing map (SOM) (Kohonen 2001) serves several analysis
functions. First, it provides a mapping from a high-dimensional space into a
low-dimensional space, thus providing a suitable means for visualization of
complex data. Second, the SOM reveals topological structures of the data.
Two points close to each other on the map display are near each other also
in the original space (however, the long map distances do not always corre-
spond with long distances in the original space). The SOM has been used
extensively for analyzing numerical data in a number of areas, including var-
ious branches of industry, medicine, and economics (Kohonen 2001). The
earliest case of using the SOM to analyze contexts of words was presented in
(Ritter & Kohonen 1989).
The illustrative simple data shown in Fig. 5 can be analyzed using the
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Word Document number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
cat 0 1 0 0 7 4 9 7
dog 1 0 0 2 6 3 7 5
horse 0 0 1 0 2 8 5 3
cow 1 1 0 0 4 6 8 2
house 8 3 2 9 0 0 1 1
building 7 1 1 7 0 1 0 0
bridge 3 7 5 1 0 0 0 0
tower 2 9 8 0 0 0 1 0
Figure 5: An illustrative example of a data set where the number of occur-
rences of the words in eight different documents is given.
SOM, resulting in a map shown in Fig. 6. Relative distances in the original
eight-dimensional space are illustrated by the shading: the darker an area on
the map, the higher the distance. Therefore, it is clearly visible, for instance,
that the words “tower”, “bridge”, “house” and “building” are separated from
the words “horse”, “cow”, “cat”, and “dog”. When richer contextual data is
available, more fine-grained distinctions emerge (see, e.g., Honkela, Pulkki
& Kohonen 1995, Lagus, Airola & Creutz 2002).
Figure 6: A map of words as a results of a SOM-based analysis of a term-
document matrix.
.
In the GICA method, the idea of considering the statistics of some items
such as words in their contexts is taken a step further. As we have in the
introductory section of this paper aimed to carefully show, subjectivity is an
inherent aspect of interpretation. In order to capture the aspect of subjec-
tiveness, we add a third dimension to the analysis. Namely, we extend the
equation items × contexts into items × contexts × subjects, i.e. we con-
sider what is the contribution of each subject in the context analysis. This
idea is illustrated in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: An illustration of an item-context matrix of rank two expanded into
a “subjectivity cube” of rank three. In other words, we perform an exten-
sion of a a×c-dimensional matrix into a a×c×s-dimensional data matrix in
which the data provided by different subjects on focus items and contexts are
included. Here a refers to the number of items, c to the number of contexts,
and s to the number of subjects.
For the practical analysis of the data, it is useful to flatten the cube in one
way or another to obtain an analysis of the focus items, subjects and contexts.
Such flattening is shown in Figs 8 and 9.
Figure 8: The a×c×s-dimensional subjectivity cube flattened into a matrix
in which each row corresponds to a unique combination of a subject and an
item and each column corresponds to a particular context. The number of
rows in this matrix is a×s and the number of columns is c. A specific analysis
of such a matrix on wellbeing concepts is shown in Fig. 14. If this matrix is
transposed, i.e. columns are transformed into rows and vice versa, an analysis
of the contexts can be obtained. This is demonstrated in Fig. 16.
3.2 Preparation and specifying the topic
The purpose of the preparatory step is to collect necessary information for a
workshop or series of workshops that are called focus sessions. The prepa-
ration is typically organized by a person or group to whom the topic is im-
20 3 THE GICA METHOD
Figure 9: The a×c×s-dimensional subjectivity cube flattened into a matrix
in which each column corresponds to a subject and each row to a unique
combination of an item and a context. The number of rows in this matrix is
a×c and the number of columns is s. A transpose of this matrix gives rise to
a map of persons (see Figure 17).
portant but who preferably does not have a strong bias related to the topic
and thus is able to respect the importance of multiple points of view. In the
preparation, the topic at hand and relevant stakeholder groups need to be
specified. The representatives of stakeholder groups help in collecting in-
formation needed in the focus session stage (B). The detailed steps of the
preparation are described below.
The topic needs to be described in some detail to set a context for the pro-
cess. The topic may be anything ranging from issues such as nuclear power
to others like preventive health care. In our illustrative case the topic is well-
being. A related, but not a full GICA analysis of subjective conceptions have
been conducted in the area of philosophical education (Rusanen, Lappi,
Honkela & Nederström 2008) and religious belief systems (Pyysiäinen, Lin-
deman & Honkela 2003).
Determining relevant stakeholder groups
When the topic has been fixed, it is important to determine the relevant
stakeholder groups and invite representatives of those into the process. For
the success of the process, it is beneficial to invite people with very differ-
ent backgrounds concerning their education and experience related to the
topic at hand. Inside a company, this might mean inviting representatives
from marketing and sales as well as product development departments. In
our case, we had two student groups, one consisting of students of informa-
tion and computer science (machine learning and data mining in particular)
and the other one design students. In a full scale application of the GICA
method, wellbeing concepts could be considered by stakeholders represent-
ing citizens/consumers, patients groups, healthcare professionals, administra-
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tors and politicians.
Collecting focus items from relevant stakeholders and others
The focus items should represent central conceptual themes related to the
topic at hand. These items are usually terms that are used in the domain,
with the assumption that they are known by all the participants without fur-
ther explanation. They may be terms regarding which we suspect that there
might exist conceptual differences among the participants, or terms on which
having a shared understanding is of central importance. In any case, the
focus items should be chosen so that the possibility for revealing the most
important conceptual differences is maximized.
In our illustrative example, the items are chosen from the domain of well-
being. Originally the list consisted of eight items (wellbeing, fitness, tired-
ness, good food, stress, relaxation, loneliness and happiness), but at a later
stage of the process the list was narrowed down to four items (relaxation, hap-
piness, fitness, wellbeing).
Collecting context items
The next step in the method is to collect a number of relevant contexts to-
wards which the previously collected focus items can be reflected. In prin-
ciple, the context items can be short textual descriptions, longer stories, or
even multimodal items such as physical objects, images or videos. The un-
derlying idea is that between the focus items and the contexts there is some
kind of potential link of a varying degree. It is important to choose the con-
texts in such a manner that they are as clear and unambiguous as possible.
The differences in the interpretations of the focus items is best revealed if the
“reflection surface” of the context items is as shared as possible among the
participants. Therefore, the context items can include richer descriptions
and even multimodal grounding.
The number of focus items and contexts determines the overall number of
inputs to be given. Naturally, if the number of focus items and/or contexts is
very high, the task becomes overwhelming to the participants. Therefore the
number of focus items should be kept reasonable, for instance between 10
and 15, and the number of contexts should be such that the dimensions are
enough to bring to the light the differences between the conceptual views of
the persons.
In other terms, there is an important link to the theoretical aspects intro-
duced in Chapter 2. Namely, focus items are positioned to the space spanned
by the dimensions of the contextual items.
In the wellbeing workshop, the participants were asked to list concepts
related to eight areas related to wellbeing (wellbeing, fitness, tiredness, good
food, stress, relaxation, loneliness and happiness). The participants listed 744
terms among which 182 were mentioned by more than one person. Unique
items included “homesickness”, “handicrafts”, “grandma’s pancakes”, etc.
The terms that appeared more than 5 times are shown in Fig. 10. From
the set of these 37 terms 24 were finally selected as the context items (see
Fig. 11).
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Item Frequency Item Frequency
friends 33 safety 7
health 23 exercise 7
family 23 delicious 7
sleep 14 success 6
music 13 sleeping 6
work 11 relaxation 6
time 10 pressure 6
happiness 10 nutrition 6
depression 10 nature 6
stress 9 home 6
sports 9 wine 5
healthy 9 satisfaction 5
fresh 9 physical health 5
food 9 love 5
darkness 9 hurry 5
sport 8 healthy food 5
freedom 8 deadline 5
travelling 7 bed 5
social interaction 7 ... ...
Figure 10: Most common items associated by the participants with eight
terms related to wellbeing.
3.3 Focus session
The topic, focus items and contexts are presented by the session organizer
to the participants. The presentation should be conducted as “neutrally” as
possible to avoid raising issues that refer to the value or opinion differences
related to the topic. Naturally, such connotations cannot be fully avoided
and therefore some means for creating a generally relaxed and respectful
atmosphere should be in use. The presentation of the focus items should be
very plain so that no discussion is conducted related to them, i.e. basically
they are just listed. On the other hand, the contexts are introduced with some
detail. They are meant to be the common ground. Referring to the theory
Time Family Freedom
Travelling Health Enjoyment
Sport Sleep Success
Exercise Music Nutrition
Work Pleasure Sun
Friends Satisfaction Nature
Social interaction Relaxation Forest
Sharing Harmony Money
Figure 11: Context items for the wellbeing case, selected from the most com-
mon terms generated by workshop participants by association.
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of concepts (see Section 2), the context items serve as the quality dimensions
that span the conceptual space. In order to effectively compare the differing
conceptions related to the focus items, it is thus important that the grounding
dimensions are understood as commonly as possible. This is, of course, only
possible to some degree.
As a result of this step, the participants are aware of the context items which
are used in the analysis and should be ready to fill in a questionnaire that is
presented to them in the next step.
Filling in the Cube
The participants are then asked to fill in a data matrix which typically consists
of the focus items as rows and the contexts as columns. Each individual’s
task is to determine how strongly a focus item is associated with a context. A
graded scale can be considered beneficial.
Figure 12: A fraction of an input form implemented using Google Docs.
There are several options regarding how the data collection can be con-
ducted. It is possible to create a form on paper that is given to the participants
to be filled in (such as in Fig. 12). Filling in the data takes place usually dur-
ing the session because it is preceded by the introduction to the contexts. If
there are any open questions related to the contexts, these are answered and
discussed in a shared manner so that potential for creating a shared ground
is maximized.
The data can also be collected with the help of some technological means.
For instance, the participants may have access to a web page containing the
input form, or the same functionality can be provided with mobile phone
technology. In our wellbeing case, we used Google Docs to implement the
questionnaire (see Fig. 12). This kind of web-based solution makes it easier
to continue with the analysis as the data is readily in electronic form.
For further processing, the input data must be encoded as a data matrix
that consists of all the answers by the participants. There are several possi-
bilities for this. For instance, if the data has been gathered in paper form,
there must be enough human resources available for typing these into the
computer system. A simple solution is to have a spreadsheet file. In it, from
each participant we now have a “data sheet” of the kind depicted in Fig. 4.
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Together these sheets form the data cube.
As a result of this step, the “Cube” is full of data ready for analysis. In our
example, the size of the data cube is 4 x 24 x 13 (concepts, context items,
subjects), and each point in the cube is a number between 1–5. The data
analysis process is presented in the following.
Data analysis and visualization
The data collected in the previous task is analyzed using some suitable data
analysis method. The essential aspect is to be able to present the rich data in
a compact and understandable manner so that the conceptual differences are
highlighted. In the following, we present an example where we look at some
details of the data cube using histograms, and then try to form an overview
using the Self-Organizing Map algorithm. As discussed earlier, other similar
methods can also be applied.
Figure 13: The distribution of answers for some context items associated with
happiness. Among these four contexts, friends seem to be most positively as-
sociated with happiness, followed by social interaction. At least in this rather
small data set, money has an interesting bimodal distribution with two peaks.
The diagrams in Fig. 13 represent a small fraction of the data gathered
in our wellbeing case. Looking at these can be very informative for deeper
3 THE GICA METHOD 25
analysis of individual concepts in terms of their context items. For exam-
ple, here we can conclude that the strong connection between Friends and
Happiness is generally agreed, whereas the connection between Money and
Happiness shows considerable variation, with Social interaction and Forest
falling in between.
Next, we will look at ways to summarize the data cube more holistically
from different angles.
Figure 14: Map of the subjects (numbered 1-13) and their views on wellbeing
(Wel), happiness (Hap), fitness (Fit) and relaxation (Rel).
When the subject-focus item-context cube is available, there are several
options for analyzing it. The basic option is to consider all alternatives pre-
sented in Figs 8 and 9. These alternatives include creating a map of 1) the
subjects and focus items jointly based on the context items (see Fig. 14), 2)
the context items based on how they were associated with the focus items
by each of the subjects (see Fig. 16), and 3) the subjects based on their re-
sponses considering the relationship between the focus and context items
(see Fig. 17).
In our case, the subjects cannot be identified, neither they are divided into
any classes. In an analysis supporting some participatory process, the subjects
could be labeled on the map with the stakeholder information. This would
facilitate insights on differences of the conceptual views held by different
stakeholder groups.
In the present analysis on the wellbeing concepts, one clear finding can be
reported. Namely, after a careful inspection Fig. 14 reveals that the views on
relaxation are widely scattered on the map whereas especially the concepts of
happiness and fitness are much more concentrated on the map and therefore
intersubjectively shared. Happiness becomes located on the left and lower
parts of the map. Fitness is located on the upper and upper right parts. As
a strikingly different case, relaxation is not viewed in an uniform manner
by the subjects. For example, for the subject 9, relaxation is located on the
upper left corner of the map whereas the subject 7 is located on the opposite
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Figure 15: Distributions of context items on the map shown in Figure 14. In
these diagrams, a dark color corresponds to a high value (close to 5) and a
light color to a low value (close to 1).
corner. The rest of the subjects are scattered around the map without any
obvious pattern.
In addition to considering the value of the context assessment of each
subject-focus item pair shown in Fig. 14, one can also analyze the relation-
ships between the distributions of each context item. The distributions are
shown in Fig. 15. For instance, the distribution of the Exercise context on
the map coincides very well with the focus items on Fitness in Fig. 14. The
distribution of Exercise seems to be quite opposite to that of Travelling, So-
cial interaction or Friends. This seems to indicate that the participants have
viewed exercise to be separate from the social aspect of life. It is not a surprise
that the distributions on please and satisfaction coincide almost fully.
The relationships between the focus items can be made explicit by cre-
ating a map shown in Fig. 16. As an example of a clear result, one can
pay attention to some specific pairs of context items. Each item in the pairs
“money-success”, “sharing-social interaction”, “sport-exercise” and “sleep-relaxation”
can be found near one another on the map. They can therefore be consid-
ered as closely related context items among the participants of this survey.
As we are not showing the identity of the persons who participated the
analysis, an informed interpretation of the map shown in Fig. 17 is not pos-
sible here. Remembering that the dark colors on the map denote large dis-
tances in the original data space, it can be concluded, for instance, that sub-
jects 6 and 9 are very similar to each other but at the same time considerably
different from all the others.
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Figure 16: Map of context items.
Figure 17: Map of people.
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3.4 Knowledge to action
The results of the analysis can be utilized in working with the participants.
For example, the map of people can be examined to see whether clear groups
of different conceptualizations arise. The found differences among the groups
can then be looked into more closely (i.e. which concepts differ, and in
which of the context terms, as was done with the Relaxation concept). Inter-
active presentation of such results to the participants and subsequent discus-
sion is likely to clarify the different conceptualizations among the group.
Figure 18: Potential epistemological and social outcomes of the use of the
GICA method.
One potentially useful practice is to use the GICA method to detect and
highlight potential of and cases of false disagreement (as well as false agree-
ment, see Section 1.4). As an overall result, we expect to see heightened mu-
tual respect and increased ease of communication among the participants.
Fig. 18 summarizes the potential benefits and areas of use for the method.
4 DISCUSSION
In the following, we discuss potential application contexts for the GICA
method. In our view, the newmethod is highly useful in, at least, the contexts
of 1) participatory decision making processes (e.g. Rowe and Frewer 2000;
McNie 2000) and 2) participatory or user-centered design (e.g. Schuler and
Namioka 1993; Asaro 2000). Here, we will consider only the first of these
application contexts in more detail. We begin by providing a brief review
of participatory methods at a general level. Next, we discuss the so-called Q
method, which has been claimed to provide access to differences in individ-
ual subjectivities, and relate this method to a general discussion on barriers
for successful communication in participatory processes. Finally, we consider
the usefulness of our method in the selected application context.
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4.1 Participatory methods
Research across various disciplines and topic areas has identified a number
of methods of involving people in decision making. For instance, Rowe
and Frewer (2005) list over a hundred different public engagement meth-
ods, some examples of which are community-based initiatives, community
research, deliberative polling, citizen juries, stakeholder dialogues, scenario
workshops, consultative panels, participatory planning processes, participa-
tory development, consensus conferences, stakeholder collaboration, and in-
tegrated resource management (McNie 2007).
Rowe and Frewer (2000) have developed a framework for evaluating dif-
ferent public participatory methods specifying a number of evaluation criteria
essential for effective public participation. These fall into two types: accep-
tance criteria, which concern features of a method that makes it acceptable
to a wider public, and process criteria, which concern features of the process
that are liable to ensure that it takes place in an effective manner (Rowe and
Frewer 2005: 3). Examples of the former are representativeness of partici-
pants, independence of true participants, early involvement, influence on fi-
nal policy, and transparency of the process to the public. Examples of the lat-
ter are resource accessibility, task definition, structured decision making, and
cost-effectiveness (Rowe and Frewer 2005: 19-20). In their later typology of
public engagement mechanisms, Rowe and Frewer identify key variables that
may theoretically affect effectiveness – participant selection method, facilita-
tion of information elicitation, response mode, information input, medium
of information transfer, and facilitation of aggregation – and based on these
variables categorize public engagement mechanisms into communicative,
consultative, and participatory (Rowe and Frewer 2005: 251, 265).
The methods listed by Rowe and Frewer that come closest to the method
presented in this paper fall under the participatory type. Mechanisms listed
under this type are action planning, citizen’s jury, consensus conference, de-
liberative opinion poll, negotiated rulemaking, planning cell, task force, and
town meeting with voting (Rowe and Frewer 2005: 277). Rowe and Frewer
furthermore divide these mechanisms into four sub-types. Participation type
1 encompasses action planning workshops, citizens’ juries, and consensus
conferences, and is characterized by the controlled selection of participants,
facilitated group discussions, unconstrained participant responses, and flexi-
ble input from “sponsors” often in the form of experts. The group output is
not structured as such. Participation type 2 includes negotiated rulemaking
and task forces. This sub-type is similar to type 1 but with the difference that
there is no facilitation of the information elicitation process. Often small
groups are used, with ready access to all relevant information, to solve spe-
cific problems. Participation type 3 contains deliberative opinion polls and
planning cells. This class is also similar to type 1 but with the difference
that structured aggregation takes place. In the case of deliberative opinion
polling, the selected participants are polled twice, before and after deliber-
ation of the selected issue, and in this process, structured aggregation of all
participant polls is attained. Planning cells tend to include various decision
aids to ensure structured consideration and assessment and hence aggrega-
tion of opinions. Finally, participation type 4 encompassing town meeting
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with voting is different from the other subtypes in that selection of partici-
pants is uncontrolled, and there is no facilitation of information elicitation,
although aggregation is structured. (Rowe and Frewer 2005: 281-282).
4.2 Focusing on subjective differences: The Q method
Although recognized by most methods of public engagement and every ac-
tive practitioner, reference to differences in the ways in which participants
subjectively experience the world is not explicitly made in the methods listed
by Rowe and Frewer. However, this has been the explicit focus of the so
called Q methodology developed by the British physicist and psychologist
William Stephenson in the beginning of the 20th century (Brown 2001) and
increasingly used in social scientific research, including research on partici-
patory methods in environmental decision making (see e.g. Webler, Daniel-
son and Tuler 2010). The name “Q” comes from the form of factor analysis
that is used to analyze the data. Normal factor analysis or the “R” method
strives to find correlations between variables across a sample of subjects. The
Q method, in contrast, looks for correlations between subjects across a sam-
ple of variables; it reduces the many individual viewpoints on the subject
down to a few “factors”, which represent shared ways of thinking about some
issue (Wikipedia article on “Q method”, Brown 2001).
The Q method starts with the often social scientific researcher collecting
a “concourse” on some issue, i.e. a summary presentation, in the form of
statements, of all things people say about that issue. Commonly a structured
sampling method is used in order to ensure that the statement sample in-
cludes the full breadth of the concourse. Then, data for Q factor analysis
is generated by a series of “Q sorts” performed by one or more subjects. A
Q sort is a ranking of variables, typically presented as statements printed on
small cards, according to some condition of instruction. In a typical Q study,
a sample of participants, a “P set”, would be invited to represent their own
views about some issue by sorting the statements from agree (+5) to disagree
(-5), with scale scores provided to assist the participant in thinking about the
task (Brown 2001). The use of ranking is meant to capture the idea that
people think about ideas in relation to other ideas, rather than in isolation
(Wikipedia). Unlike objective tests and traits, subjectivity is here understood
to be self-referential, i.e. it is “I” who believes that something is the case and
who registers that belief by placing a statement e.g. towards the +3 pole of the
Q-sort scoring continuum (Brown 2001). The factor analysis of correlation
matrices leads to what Stephenson called “factors of operant subjectivity”, so
called because the emergence of those factors is in no way dependent on ef-
fects built into the measuring device. The Q methodology is thus based on
the axiom of subjectivity and its centrality in human affairs, and it is the pur-
pose of the Q technique to enable persons to represent their vantage points
for purposes of holding it constant for inspection and comparison. (Brown
2001)
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4.3 Barriers for successful communication in participatory processes
The Q method can be understood as attempting to address one of the many
barriers to overcoming difficulties associated with differences in perspective
among participants in participatory processes. This is also the view of Don-
ner (2001: 24), who understands this methodology to fill the gap between
qualitative tools to capture these perspectives, which can be detailed and
contextual but also messy, time-consuming, and difficult to administer con-
sistently, and quantitative tools, which can be clear and methodical, but also
oversimplified, rigid, and unwieldy. The Q method, by being a tool that
combines the richness of interviews with the standardization of a survey, thus
represents an attempt to make such differences “discussible, as an early as an
early step in a collaborative effort to help construct action plans that most
stakeholders can embrace” (2001: 24). It allows social scientific researchers
to explore a complex problem from a subject’s – the participant’s – point of
view, i.e. in accordance with how they see the issue at hand: “Because the re-
sults of a Q-sort analysis capture the subjective ’points of view’ of participants,
and because the data are easy to gather, easy to analyze, and easy to present,
Q-methodology is good not only as a research tool but also as a participatory
exercise” (Donner 2001).
From the research on the integration of knowledge perspectives (for in-
stance, Thompson Klein 1990; Bruun, Langlais and Janasik 2005; Bruun,
Thompson Klein, Huutoniemi & Hukkinen 2005) we know that overcoming
difficulties associated with differences in perspective is no easy task. There
are numerous barriers to such communication across perspectives. For in-
stance, Bruun et al. 2005 list the following barriers: (1) Structural barri-
ers, which concern the organizational structure of knowledge production;
(2) Knowledge barriers, which are constituted by the lack of familiarity that
people working within one knowledge domain have with people from other
knowledge domains; (3) Cultural barriers, which are formed by differences
in cultural characteristics of different fields of work and inquiry, particularly
the language used and the style of argumentation; this category also includes
differences in values; (4) Epistemological barriers, which are caused by dif-
ferences in domains of how they see the world and what they find interesting
in it; (5) Methodological barriers, which arise when different styles of work
and inquiry confront each other; (6) Psychological barriers, which occur as a
result of the intellectual and emotional investments that people have made
in their own domain and intellectual community; and finally (7) Reception
barriers, which emerge a particular knowledge perspective is communicated
to an audience that does not understand, or does want to see, the value of
communication across and integration of knowledge perspectives (Bruun,
Thompson Klein, et al. 2005: 60-61).
4.4 Summarizing our contribution
The barriers that the Q method attempts to address mainly revolve around
the cultural, knowledge, and epistemological barriers. The method thus
shares many of the assumptions of the GICA method developed in this pa-
per, not least the “axiom of subjectivity”. However, the Q methodology does
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not explicitly address the potentially different ways in which members of P
sets understand the concepts used in the concourse or statement pool dif-
ferently. It might be that when reading the statements in the concourse,
different participants take the concepts used in them to mean very different
things. Therefore, although sophisticated from the point of view of captur-
ing the potentially different ways in which the participants experience their
world, the Q method might still mask conceptual differences in underlying
world views. We therefore propose an additional barrier to successful com-
munication across different perspectives, that of conceptual barriers, which
occur as a result of the different ways in which stakeholders conceptualize
and make sense of their worlds (Honkela et al. 2008).
Furthermore, based on our brief review of participatory methods and bar-
riers to collaborative action and of the until now closest approximation of
subjective differences, the Q method, we suggest that the GICA method as
we have developed it here provides a unique and relatively easily adminis-
tered way of approaching the subtle yet potentially significant conceptual dif-
ferences of participants in various kinds of participatory processes. As such,
it partakes in a general endeavor of decreasing language-related misunder-
standings and resulting collapses of meaning and action.
4.5 Future directions
This report is the first full presentation of the GICA method in its explicit
form. We plan to apply the method in different real world cases to gain
additional understanding on the applicability of the method and to facilitate
its further development. We also consider providing access to computational
tools that would help the community to use the method.
In addition to the approach presented in this report, there are other al-
ternatives for obtaining data for a focus item-context-subject matrix. The
subjects may be asked to provide associations to the focus items. This gives
rise to a sparse data that also resembles labeling data gathered through crowd-
sourcing. Furthermore, one can create the matrix by analyzing text corpora
written by different authors. In order to conduct the analysis in a meaning-
ful and successful manner, a sophisticated preprocessing phase is needed.
Perhaps the most advanced but at the same time most challenging approach
would be to apply brain imaging techniques (see e.g. Pulvermüller 2001).
We are aware of the fact that often conceptualizations are tightly con-
nected with values (see Janasik, Salmi & Castán Broto 2010). We plan to
extend the GICA method to address this issue explicitly by allowing the state-
ments related to each topic and the underlying concepts to be analyzed in
parallel.
In summary, we wish that the GICA method will be a useful tool for in-
creasing mutual understanding wherever it is needed.
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